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Abstract
Much has happened since the 1960s and 1970s when the idea of self-organization emerged and began to alter
our conceptions of human nature, of social organization, and of a social science that had heretofore been
wedded to linear causal explanations. The experience that systems could organize themselves has been
revolutionary and constitutes a paradigm shift that is still ongoing. In the following, I will (A) distinguish
between indigenously and self-organizing systems, (B) consider autopoiesis as a biological step towards
selfhood, (C) propose a way to distinguish selves and Others, and, based on this, (D) suggest self-organization
to be a social phenomenon. As the notion of self-organization reconceptualizes social organization and human
experience, I will close with (E), suggestions for further work on self-organization.
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 Much has happened since the 1960s and 1970s when the idea of self-organization 
emerged and began to alter our conceptions of human nature, of social organization, and of a social 
science that had heretofore been wedded to linear causal explanations.  The experience that systems 
could organize themselves has been revolutionary and constitutes a paradigm shift that is still 
ongoing.  In the following, I will (A) distinguish between indigenously and self-organizing systems, 
(B) consider autopoiesis as a biological step towards selfhood, (C) propose a way to distinguish 
selves and Others, and, based on this, (D) suggest self-organization to be a social phenomenon.  As 
the notion of self-organization reconceptualizes social organization and human experience, I will 
close with (E), suggestions for further work on self-organization. 
 
Indigenously Organizing versus Self-organizing Systems 
Among the phenomena that have been identified as self-organizing (Ashby, 1947; Yovits & 
Cameron, 1960; Foerster & Zopf, 1962; Maruyama, 1963; Varela, 1979; Ulrich & Probst 1984; 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Eigen, 1988; Haken, 1988, Paslack, 1991) are: 
 The replicable unfolding of unpredictable forms of organization, whether they are determined 
by recursive functions (fractals), the structural properties of a system’s components (crystal 
growth), a combination of both (artificial life simulated on a computer), or by certain controlling 
parts of a larger system (DNA within living organisms). 
 Statistically unusual yet sustainable forms of coordination (laser light, tornados). 
 The spontaneous emergence of organization resulting from interactions among already 
organized parts (social organization, beehives, for a rudimentary example, or crowds). 
Beyond Coherence 2 
 The rise of latent forms of organization which are unintended and beyond the constituent parts 
of a system’s ability to monitor them (institutional hierarchies or organizational cultures like 
feudalism or postmodernism). 
 A decrease of entropy inside a system relative to the entropy in the system’s environment.  
I was always uncomfortable speaking of such systems as self-organizing when they do not 
speak for themselves, when it is a theory that decides what they are.  Let me be clear in how 
theorists are implicated in this characterization.  First, observers distinguish between the system and 
its environment and then proceed to measure or describe what they consider its organization against 
a background of their own experiences.  Systems so defined, especially their self, cannot possibly 
be divorced from the conceptions observers bring to them.  Second, the “self” such systems is 
recognized mainly in the negative: The “unpredictability” of a system’s organization, the “absence” 
of instructions (information about appropriate organizational forms) flowing across the system’s 
boundary, the inadequacy of adaptational explanations when self-organizing systems are defined 
not to respond to their environment independent of their organization.  Apparently, the supposed 
“nature” of self-organizing systems results from their observers’ actions and from their inability to 
locate a source for their organization outside it.  Here, “selves” are observers’ attributes, not shared 
by the observed system.  I prefer to call such systems indigenously organized. 
 
Autopoiesis, a Biological Condition to Selfhood 
A first step towards understanding systems that are capable of defining themselves has been 
taken by the biologists Maturana and Varela (1980, 1988).  Ontogenetically, they argue, all living 
systems operate as recursive networks of interactions that draw and preserve their boundary, thus 
distinguishing themselves against the background of what they are not.  Living systems organize 
themselves under continuous perturbations from their environment, which may well include their 
observer.  Living systems incorporate matter from their environment, but regard anything that enters 
it under the perspective of their own (existing) organization.  Thus, living systems are constituted in 
a network of interactions that produces all the components necessary to operate that network within 
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their boundary.  Maturana and Varela call an organization (the particular form of their network of 
interactions) that is capable of this self-production autopoietic
ii
.  An autopoietic organization is 
organizationally closed in the sense that it operates recursively on its organization without knowing 
its environment independent from how it operates.  Its identity lies in the process of maintaining its 
own boundary.  Unlike in the self-organization literature, this process is not the result of an 
observer’s distinction.  However, the autopoiesis of living systems would not be recognizable if the 
distinction would fail to acknowledge that boundary. 
The theory of autopoiesis is a theory of systems that are free to develop any kind of 
organization within their boundaries, provided that this organization preserves its autopoiesis.  The 
organization of living systems is indigenous except for the need to preserve their autopoiesis
iii
.  
Thus, the organization of living systems is indigenous.  Although the preservation of a boundary is 
a prerequisite of selfhood, because autopoietic organizations can undergo considerable 
organizational drifts, I cannot yet see a self in them.  Incidentally, Maturana and Varela do not use 
the term self-organization either, although for different reasons.   
Maturana
iv
 acknowledges that observers are autopoietic systems as well and that the 
observation of living systems consists in one autopoietic system being coupled to another.  As the 
two systems interact, each under preservation of their own autopoiesis, coordination inevitably 
arises.  Language is the most noticeable historical artifact of such coordination and it is indigenous 
to that coupling.  Language brings forth what it speaks of and thus serves to coordinate that 
coordination.  However, in claiming such generalizations, Maturana is careful not to contradict his 
own autopoiesis by speaking from the illusory position of a God-like observer.  Instead, he speaks 
of his construction.  The popular use of ocular metaphors that depict observers as spectators of 
things outside is clearly unworking.  But what could another self then be? 
 
Distinguishing Constructed Selves and Others 
While autopoietic organizations cannot represent an environment they have no privileged 
access to, they can nevertheless organize themselves under conditions of continuous perturbation 
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from that environment.  Within their organization, living systems can thus be said to construct their 
own indigenous realities, realities that are informed by their own history of responding to past 
perturbations.  In trying to account for Others, it has been tempting to vacillate between two 
extreme assumptions, the assumption of a coherent ontology that is same for everyone and the 
assumption of us being solipsists.  Both assumptions are anti-social in their ultimate effect.  When 
two observers face each other, they cannot help but acknowledging each other’s presence.  How 
they see each other and enact their respective conceptions has profound consequences for what 
survives.  The freedom to construct any reality they please is ultimately constrained by whether they 
preserve the autopoiesis of each
v
. 
This is where von Foerster’s Principle of Relativity applies.  The Principle suggests 
“reject(ing any) hypothesis when it does not hold for two instances together, although it holds for 
each instance separately” (1980b:307).  For example, when two solipsists meet, their worldview 
falls to pieces as soon as they acknowledge meeting someone like them.  And, as soon as they do 
construct another organism that is capable of constructing their own reality, neither can claim to 
play God and observe the Other directly and from no particular standpoint or perspective.  Thus, as 
mutual observers, each must grant the other what they claim distinguishes them: the ability of 
maintaining a boundary, of organizing themselves indigenously, of constructing complementary 
“selves” and “Others,” and of observing the consequences of enacting their constructions.  This 
precludes the temptations of both, objectivism and solipsism, and brings us on a middle way.  
I must point out the obvious, that the Principle of Relativity stated in language, a language 
that the two observers are presumed to understand (or coordinate their actions with).  Von Foerster 
(1980b:307) points out that the Principle is not a hypothesis whose truth or falsity is decided by 
evidence.  Rather, it offers a choice between conceiving themselves at the center of their own 
universe (solipsism) or playing God (objectivism), on the one side, and making the relation between 
Thou and I the central reference, on the other.  This is also the choice of languaging in monologue 
and languaging in dialogue.  The second alternative leads us to a recursive conception self as 
capable of making choices and becoming accountable to Others for all consequences arising out of 
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this conception (Shotter, 1984).  It acknowledges observers and observed Others as linguistically 
capable agents and participants in the phenomena being described.  And it invokes a paradigm shift 
for social inquiry.  It should be pointed out that rejecting this choice is a choice as well, albeit one 
that significantly impairs our ability to understand social phenomena. 
The complementary construction of self and Others is entirely consistent with what we know 
of our human biology, of our autopoiesis.  However, it speaks against the belief in a scientific 
ontology, the illusion of being able to access an observer-independent objective world, and the 
illusion of being able to observe a reality without an observer.  Instead, it renders even simple acts 
of observation, especially of Others, as social phenomenon.  Under these conditions, accounts of 
observations then become less a matter of truth or falsity, as von Foerster points out regarding his 
Principle, but whether we, as selves and as Others, can live with them. These conclusions underlie 
much of social constructivist thinking.  The key to enter the world of Others is to go beyond 
coherence. 
 
Social Phenomena and the Necessity of Second-order Understanding 
Social phenomena, like money, a family, the Internet or a corporation are constituted in the 
understanding its human constituents have of it.  If enough people question the value of money, it 
can no longer serve as such.  If the members of a family no longer see themselves as members of 
that family, the family has ceased to exist.  If nobody knows how Others use the Internet, there can 
be no Internet the way we know it now.  Corporations reside in networks of commitments that are 
continuously enacted within them.  Social constructions so conceived are indigenous social forms 
and cannot be understood without a conception of how Others are involved. 
Participation in social phenomena requires not just an understanding of that phenomenon 
(e.g. as a technology, as a means to an end) but also an understanding of other participants’ 
understanding of that phenomenon.  The understanding of Others’ understanding of social 
phenomena is an understanding of understanding and radically different from an understanding of 
the causal objects of the natural sciences.  I have called the understanding of understanding a 
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second-order understanding.  By contrast, bureaucracies, hierarchical command structures, and user 
instructions succeed only when there is no difference between an authority’s understanding and 
their subjects’ understanding, when their understanding is the same.  Under these extreme 
conditions communication reduces to the application of a code, words mean the same as for 
everyone, and human agency is reduced to deciding on efficient actions.  Whenever this is so, the 
assumption that we all live in the same coherent universe may not get us into difficulties and 
second-order understanding reduces to a first-order understanding of how deviate from that norm or 
are impaired.  Indeed, first-order understanding is encouraged wherever control is intended or 
hegemony is believed to rule. 
Consistency is the criterion of first-order understanding.  The natural sciences have taken the 
construction of just one uni-verse as their aim and thus specialize in this kind of understanding.  For 
example, when theories are encountered that contradict with one another or data turn up that fail to 
support a given theory, natural scientists are propelled to seek new theories that overcome such 
inconsistencies.  Triangulation too is a well-known scientific method that eliminates propositions 
that do not fit.  The natural sciences are dedicated to preserve coherency of their construction of a 
uni-verse.  Natural science methods cannot but standardize reality for everyone and marginalizes 
otherness.  Indigenous forms of organization, autopoiesis, the human ability to construct selves and 
Others, the dialogical nature of languaging have no place in consistent constructions and are denied 
in first-order accounts of nature. 
Second-order understanding is, as I have suggested, an understanding of Others’ 
understanding.  It grants Others to have the very abilities we claim for ourselves: to observe, to 
construct, to live with Others, and to understand their worlds.  The Principle of Relativity would 
suggest that, in the social domain, we must not merely respect but celebrate the possibility of 
diverse and equally valid reality constructions.  Second-order understanding must embrace logics 
different from our own in our own and live with inconsistencies across these realities -- as long as 
they do not violate the autopoiesis of their constituents
vi
.  Second-order understanding becomes 
manifest in social theories that leave adequate openings for the constituents of the theorized 
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phenomena to enter their own theories into them.  Social theories need not and, where they do 
respect the otherness of Others, cannot be logically coherent. 
Logically coherent social theories may well serve purposes of social control – much as 
causal theories can be used to construct mechanical devices.  Coherent theories of self-organization 
fail to acknowledge the autopoiesis of the human constituents of these phenomena and their 
attendant freedom to organize themselves indigenously.  The celebration of coherency at the 
expense of multi-logical constructions of selves and Others therefore entails the danger of 
oppression. 
Let me amplify the argument against coherence as a criterion for theories in the social 
domain, which the title of this article promised.  Bohm (1996) borrowed the metaphor of the laser as 
“coherent light” from physics to talk about coherence of human action toward common aims and 
considers coherence one result of dialogue.  I am aware of the dual meaning of the word 
“coherence” -- coordination of action on the one side, and the absence of contradictions on the 
other.  Bohm is never so clear about the difference.  I am leery about the entailments of using 
physical metaphors in explanations of social phenomena, precisely because it erodes the very 
human agency that the idea of autopoiesis and of self-organization seeks to recover from centuries 
of oppressive theorizing.  If coherence is the aim, oppressive regimes are quick to follow. 
Cherishing incoherences would be a far more respectful aim for the participants in social 
phenomena as well as for social scientists attempting to account for them.  It would honor the 
necessarily indigenous nature of human understanding.  It would grant selves to emerge in the 
making of choices.  It would encourage dialogue -- especially in holding individuals to be 
accountable to each other for their actions.  It would consider interventions in the unfolding 
dynamics of social reality part of that reality.  It would also see social scientists as necessary 
participants in the very social phenomena they try to understand. 
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Implications of Self-Organization 
If we are willing to consider self-organization as a phenomenon that involves human beings, 
who, by choosing to construct a world and live in it, demonstrate to themselves that they have 
selves different from that of Others, then we have to learn to live with diverse reality constructions, 
with many concurrent and potentially incommensurate logics, not just our own.  I am suggesting 
that coherent constructions of reality, scientific theories for example, prevent us from engaging in 
the kind of dialogue through which we can experience the different worlds of Others.  Dialogue is 
never complete.  In dialogue, participants remain open to redefine themselves in response to each 
other.  Inter-individual incoherences are the fuel that drives dialogue – not towards coherence, but 
towards preserving its indeterminacy from an outside.  In dialogue, whether as stakeholders or as 
social scientists, we cannot help but being co-organizers of the very system we wish to understand 
as self-organizing. 
To further theories of self-organization, I am recommending that other theorists do what I 
have tried in the forgoing:  
 To keep indigenous organization separate from self-organization.  Indigenous organization can 
occur in entirely deterministic systems, self-organization cannot. 
 To replace theorists’ attribution of abstract selves by a notion of self as capable of distinguishing 
itself from other selves.  This, I have argued, takes place in language. 
 To take self-organization as a social process, one that is constituted in the understanding that its 
constituents have of it.  Understanding different selves is a second-order understanding. 
 To consider multiple and incommensurable logics to be an essential ingredient of social 
realities.  Acceptable social theories must then remain open to the theories held by the human 
constituents of the theorized phenomena.  In the social domain, coherence cannot be an aim. 
 To admit our accountability -- not just to our scientific peers -- but foremost to those affected by 
our hypotheses.  This means reentering social theories into the very process they claim to 
describe and allowing the constituents of that process to have a voice in what such theories may 
set in motion (Krippendorff, 1996; 1998). 
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 To assure that theories of social phenomena do not violate the autopoiesis of their constituents, 
or better still, that they do not usurp the choices their constituents have to continue the process 
or leave it.  This speaks against deterministic theories of self-organization.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 This paper is the abbreviated version of a presentation to a panel on “Using Self-Organizing Systems to Theorize 
Human Organization and Experience” at the 1998 ICA Conference in Jerusalem, presented July 22, 1998. 
ii
 Maturana and Varela (1980) are not concerned with the fact that living systems are at least in part genetically 
determined.  They are correct in saying that to understand how living organisms reproduce presupposes an 
understanding of their ability to live.  This ability requires a circular form of organization, one that could be said to 
continuously unfold its own history into a future.  In that process, it must merely withstand environmental perturbations. 
iii
 Here, von Foerster’s (1980a) theory of eigen-behavior can explain the emergence of indigenous forms:  Within finite 
domains, all recursive operations, which are repeatedly applied to its own results, eventually converge to a smaller set of 
behaviors, if not to one that is repeated over and over again.  This has also been shown by Ashby (1956:73-85).  The 
behavior that eventually emerges is the sole result of the operation being repeatedly performed.  It is indigenous to it, 
and called its eigen-behavior (or eigen-value if it is a state).  Within a network of interactions, autopoietic systems 
converge to eigen-organizations that are the products of these interactions as well as of the history of the perturbations 
experienced.  Indigenous or eigen-organizations are relatively stable and are responsible for how the system continues 
its autopoiesis, including how it interacts with its environment.  It is that system’s reality.  Von Foerster summarizes 
these considerations in a Postulate of Cognitive Homeostasis:  “The nervous system is organized (or organizes itself) so 
that it computes a stable reality” (1980b:306). 
iv
 Personal communication. 
v
 A construction that is unable to preserve the autopoiesis of its beholder – suicide, fatal mistakes, or actions on illusions 
with mortal consequences – ceases with their host. 
vi
 When the autopoiesis of a living system is violated, it ceases to exist as that system.  To the extent social constructions 
are predicated on the understanding its constituents have of it, the constituents must remain accountable for their actions 
to other participants.  This presumes a self that only autopoietic systems can construct within their organization. 
